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Abstract—LoRaWAN is a LPWAN (Low Power Wide Area
Network) technology used in a large variety of Internet of Things
(IoT) applications. The paper addresses the security concerns of
data protection and data privacy in sensor networks that make
use of the LoRaWAN (Long-Range Wide Area Network) protocol
specification. In this context, this paper performs an in-depth
analysis of the security aspects in LoRaWAN sensor networks.
Additionally, a novel secure LoRaWAN network architecture is
proposed. The architecture provides protected data transmission
and prevents unauthorized access and data loss. Based on
experimental results and security tests, recommendations are
made concerning the best practices to be followed in order to
provide secure data transmission and data privacy in applications
built using the LoRaWAN protocol specification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things are becoming ubiquitous and a core
business focus in the global market. The IoT concept is widely
used in a large variety of applications related to monitoring,
surveillance, tracking or environment measurements. In the
near future, a fast expansion of IoT is foreseen, the number
of IoT devices being expected to reach the value of 50 billion
till 2020 [4].
The fundamental requirements and design constraints as-
sociated with IoT applications include communication range,
battery lifetime, robustness to interference, network capacity,
network security, uni- versus bi-directional communication
and variety of served applications. At this time, multiple
vendors provide communication technologies that can achieve
these fundamental requirements such as LoRaWAN, SigFox,
NB-IoT, LTE-M, etc.
The technology considered in this work is LoRaWAN,
which represents a good LPWAN candidate in terms of
transmission capabilities and security features. LoRaWAN
is capable to provide all fundamental requirements of IoT
including network security, network capacity, battery lifetime
and a low cost of implementation. Additionally, LoRaWAN
can serve a large variety of applications, such as water
and air pollution monitoring, elderly care, home security,
tracking, agriculture, precision farming, and many more [5].
Furthermore, LoRaWAN provides solid security features and
protections against different types of attacks such as end-node
impersonation, replay messages, eavesdropping, tampering or
message forgery. Despite of its capabilities, the security of
systems deployed over LoRaWAN does depend on the imple-
mentation and employed security controls. Moreover, although
in principle anyone can become a LoRa operator, no clear
guidelines exist on how to create secure LoRaWAN networks.
Security aspects in LoRaWAN have been addressed in
the past in [2], which presents an analysis and guidance
concerning the security of the Long Range (LoRa) solution and
its LoRaWAN protocol. This work advances over [2] by pre-
senting additional security recommendations and best practices
that have to be followed in the development of a LoRaWAN
application. These recommendations were concluded based on
security tests and simulations performed in such applications.
Moreover, a novel secure LoRaWAN network architecture is
proposed, implementing different security controls in order to
protect data transmitted over the network and to establish a
strong line of defense for the applications.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
brief overview of LoRa. The security aspects of LoRaWAN
are investigated in section 3. The proposed secure LoRaWAN
architecture is detailed in section 4. Testing scenario results are
presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 draws the conclusions
of our work.
II. LORA TECHNOLOGY
LoRa is a long-range wireless communication technology
that targets end-nodes with limited energy (battery powered),
transmitting small amount of data at a time. The physical layer,
provided by Semtech, uses a Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS)
radio modulation technique and operates on the unlicensed
radio spectrum in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM)
bands. LoRaWAN is a protocol specification built on top
of the LoRa technology to enable low power, secure, bi-
directional, wide-area communication between remote sensors
and gateways connected to the network [1].
A. LoRaWAN basic architecture
A basic LoRaWAN network architecture, follows a star
topology, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The end-nodes are communicating data over LoRaWAN
through the Gateways (G). Once data are received, the Gate-
ways are communicating the LoRa packages to the Network
Server (NS), typically via 4G/Ethernet. The Network Server
provides MAC commands and network control at end-node
Fig. 1. LoRaWAN diagram.
(N) level. The Application Server (AS) is responsible for end-
node key management and payloads sent or received by end-
nodes over the network.
LoRaWAN classifies end-nodes in three different device
classes (class A, B, C). Class A allows for bi-directional com-
munication, each uplink transmission being followed by two
downlink receive windows. Class B allows for bi-directional
communication and scheduling of receiving slots; synchro-
nized beacons are used by the Network Server to synchronize
the listening time of end-nodes and schedule downlink trans-
missions. End-nodes from Class C have nearly continuously
open receive windows, the exception being the uplink periods
when they are sending data to the network.
B. End-node configuration
In order to participate in a LoRaWAN network, an end-node
must be activated. LoRaWAN provides two ways to activate
an end-node: Over-The-Air Activation (OTAA) and Activation
By Personalization (ABP).
The information given to an end-node during the activation
process is summarized in Tab. I.
III. SECURITY ASPECTS OF LORA
LoRaWAN provides encryption and signing of packets sent
over the network. For encryption, symmetric keys known by
end-nodes, Network Server and Application Server are used,
these being distributed in two different ways, depending on
the employed activation method.
A. End-node activation
The OTAA and ABP end-node activation methods are
detailed and analyzed next.
1) OTAA: In OTAA activation, the LoRa device and the
network server are first provisioned with a unique 128bit
AppKey. Each end-node uses this key to send a join-request
message, the message being signed with the AppKey. The join-
request message contains the AppEUI and DevEUI of the end-
device followed by a 32 nonce of 2 octets (DevNonce). These
values are signed with a 4 byte Message Integrity Code (MIC).
The server calculates the MIC using the AppKey and sends
a join-accept message to the end-node if the result is valid.
For a valid result, the Network Server generates a nonce
TABLE I
INFORMATION GIVEN TO AN END-NODE DURING THE ACTIVATION
PROCESS [1].
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value (AppNonce) and calculates two 128bit keys, i.e., the
network session key (NwkSKey) and application session key
(AppSKey), based on the values received in the join-request
message.
The join-accept message contains the AppNonce value
generated by the Network Server, the end-node address (De-
vAddr), RF delays (RX Delay), and the list of channels that
can be used (CFList).
The join-accept message is encrypted with the AppKey, the
end-node being able to decrypt the data using the AppKey
stored on the device. The AppNonce received in the encrypted
message is used to locally calculate AppSKey and NwkSKey
which are subsequently used in next message exchanges.
2) ABP: For ABP, each end-node is provided with De-
vAddr, NwkSKey and AppSKey, hence, a process of join
message exchanges is not necessary for end-node activation.
DevAddr, NwkSKey and AppSKey should be unique for each
end-node.
3) Security aspects: Both ways of activation provide a
strong level of security using symmetric encryption in mes-
sage exchanges between end-node and the server. A potential
attacker may inject malicious end-nodes in the network in an
attempt to take advantage of the network. However, this is
impossible, the provided mechanisms eliminate any possibility
of an attacker to take advantage of the network in the activation
process without knowing the end-node’s keys.
B. Message encryption
LoRa provides a symmetric encryption of messages during
communication. After an end-node has joined the network,
the messages are encrypted and signed using a combination
of NwkSKey or AppSKey.
Message encryption is performed using AES128 [3], the
key used for encryption being set according to FPort value.
If the value is set to 0 then the NwkSKey is used, otherwise
the AppsKey is used. Encryption with NwkSKey is performed
when a MAC command is sent and the AppSKey is used to
encrypt the payload of data messages.
The end-node encrypts the payload using AppSKey and
signs the message using NwkSKey. The purpose of message
signing is to prevent the manipulation of the chiper-text, or of
other values included in the message by calculating a Message
Integrity Check (MIC) and validating the value at Network
Server level. If the MIC is valid, the Network Server forwards
the chiper-text to the Application Server which decrypts it
using AppSKey to obtain the payload.
C. End-node security aspects
1) Impersonation: During our security assessment of Lo-
RaWAN, multiple tests were performed attempting to im-
personate an end-node. These tests were performed by ma-
nipulating the relevant information used by end-nodes in
communication with the server.
Any attempt to manipulate the relevant information gener-
ates errors at Network Server level. This generated ”noise”
can be an indication of suspicious activity.
In a first scenario in which the end-node is impersonated
using the DevEUI value, messages sent by a malicious end-
node are rejected by the Network Server based on an invalid
MIC value. The MIC value is calculated using NwkSKey, and
for a malicious end-node the key is different than the key
stored in the server.
In a second scenario, an end-node impersonates a session of
another end-node and starts the OTAA activation process. We
consider in this case that the malicious end-node is configured
with the same DevEUI and AppKey as an end-node already
activated in the network. Once the the malicious end-node
starts the activation process, a new session is generated by
the server. In this case, messages sent by the initial end-
node in the network are signed using the old network session
key (NwkSKey). When receiving the messages, the Network
Server rejects them based on an invalid MIC value. The
malicious end-node will continue to send legit messages.
2) Replay attacks: LoRaWAN offers protection against
replay attacks by incrementing a frame counter, FCntUP or
FCntDown, for each message sent or received by an end-
node. The FCntUP counter is used for uplink messages and
the FCntDown counter is used for downlink messages. The
values of the counters are maintained by both end-node and
Network Server, and they are initialized to 0 every time the
node joins the network.
When it receives messages, the Network Server compares
the FCntUP value stored on the server with the FCntUP value
received from the end-node. If the received value is less than
or equal to the local value, the Network Server rejects the
message. This approach offers strong protection against replay
attacks.
In practice, LoRa devices have a maximum value limit of
these counters. According to LoRa specification, FCntUP/FC-
ntDown are allowed to use either 16-bits or 32-bits. This
limitations can introduce weaknesses in the implementation.
For a secure implementation that prevents replay attacks, the
Network Server should implement a re-activation mechanism
for end-nodes when FCntUP/FCntDown reach the maximum
value. One notes that this mechanism can be implemented only
for OTAA activation.
3) Session and key management: end-nodes should store
only necessary keys required for communication. Every end-
node which is part of the network should hold unique, random
keys such that a compromised end-node should not be able to
compromise other end-nodes.
Possessing the keys, an attacker is able to produce legit,
signed and encrypted messages. Messages received from end-
nodes should not be treated as trustworthy.
The keys are hardened during the chip manufacturing
process, which incurs security risks. It is a risky process
and the security depends on manufacture providers, if they
are compromised then all the keys are exposed. Another
risk represents the method used to transmit the keys to the
manufacture provider.
The management of end-node sessions is handled by the
Network Server, which is responsible for storing, removing
and modifying end-node sessions during communication. Re-
voking an end-node is a simple process, removing its entry
from the Application Server. If the end-node is not registered
at server level, the messages are not processed.
During the end-node activation process, a new session is be-
ing generated and stored by the Network Server in its database.
Each session should be stored along with an expiration time
to enforce generation of a new session when the session time
expires. When the Network Server stores a new session for a
given end-node, it must also ensure that an old session does
not exist anymore for that end-node. In case in which an old
session is active, the Network Server should replace that old
session with the new one.
Generating a large number of sessions and storing them
in a database without replacing or removing old sessions is
considered to be a security weakness. This can lead to a system
out-of-memory status, in which case no additional memory can
be allocated for use by local programs or the operating system.
The database represents a single point of failure and in case
of out-of-memory status, the network will not be functional
anymore.
4) Security Recommendations: As presented above, either
for impersonation or replay attacks, a lot of ”noise” is gen-
erated at Network Server level. The presence of rejected
messages at Network Server level should be an indication of
suspicious behavior of end-nodes. A security recommendation
is to implement a monitoring mechanism to determine the
suspicious behavior of end-nodes based on rejected messages.
To avoid out-of-memory failures at Network Server level,
the recommendation is to replace each old session with a new
session when a new activation is made. Also, an expire time is
necessary in order to remove inactive sessions after a period
of time.
D. Gateway compromise
The Gateway is a component outside of the controlled
network area and should be considered as an untrustworthy
component. The Gateway is communicating directly with the
internal network, which represents the most sensible point of
the network.
Consider an attacker that gains access to a Gateway: in this
case, the attacker is able to manipulate all radio frequency
parameters used in the communication with the end-nodes. The
manipulation of these parameters can lead to a higher power
consumption of end-nodes and/or faster battery depletion,
which in turn determines sensor breakdown and higher costs.
In the worst case scenario, an attacker would be able to block
all data in transit between the end-nodes and the server.
1) Security Recommendations: The Gateway is maintaining
the communication between end-nodes and the server, playing
the role of a packet forwarder, each message received being
forwarded to the server. Message filtering is made at server
level, which accepts only messages received from end-nodes
listed in the database, and rejecting all other messages. To
minimize the workload of the server, a best practice is to
implement message filtering at the Gateway level based on
end-node white-listing.
Additionally, the Gateway should not open other connec-
tions than those which are necessary to connect to the end-
nodes through LoRaWAN and to the network via 4G/Ethernet.
IV. PROPOSED LORAWAN SECURE NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE
Besides the standard security features provided by the
LoRaWAN communication protocol, a LoRaWAN network
should also implement a secure network architecture, which
applies security controls and monitoring over the network in
order to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability. In
this context, we propose a novel secure LoRaWAN sensor
network architecture, as detailed next.
The proposed architecture, depicted in Fig. 2, implements
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model. In this model, each
component of the infrastructure holds a certificate signed by its
own Certificate Authority (CA) implemented at network level.
All entities use these certificates to communicate with relevant
entities inside the network. This approach provides encryption,
authentication and integrity in message exchanges.
A. Gateway-network communication
The Gateway cannot be a trustworthy source, as it lies
outside of the controlled network area. As depicted in Fig. 2,
the Gateway is communicating directly with the Broker com-
ponent of the internal network. If an attacker gains control of a
Gateway, he/she is able to access directly the internal network.
For this reason, the Gateway is deemed to be the most sensible
point of the network.
To provide secure data transmission and alleviate potential
exposure to security attacks originating from the Gateway, the
proposed LoRaWAN network implements a Remote Access
Virtual Private Network (VPN) server, which is a secure tunnel
that provides encryption and authentication for Gateways con-
nected to the internal network. In order to access the internal
network, each Gateway holds a certificate generated by the
VPN server, preventing in this way any Gateway imperson-
ation attempts. Also, the VPN server maintain a white list of
Gateway IPs, avoiding in this manner the access of multiple
potentially malicious Gateways or Gateway replication.
Once connected to the internal network, the Gateways
should communicate data only with Brokers in a secure way,
over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) - see Fig. 2;
this provides security for User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
communications and prevents attacks such as eavesdropping,
tampering, or message forgery.
B. Network traffic control
1) Broker level: The Broker’s role is to transport end-
node messages received from Gateways to upper network
levels using MQTT messaging protocol. The Broker main-
tains two different connections, one with the Gateways over
UDP, respectively with the Network Server over Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP). These connections should be secured
to prevent data exposure in clear text.
As mentioned, in order to secure the connection between
the Gateway and the Broker, DTLS should be used, which is a
protocol that secures the datagram transport. Also, to provide a
secure connection between the MQTT server, implemented at
Broker level, and the Network Server, the message exchanges
should be made over Transport Layer Security (TLS), a
protocol that is capable of securing the transport over TCP.
Both entities, namely, the Network Server and the Broker, are
part of a PKI infrastructure which means that each entity uses
its certificate in message exchanges providing encryption and
authentication of messages.
For improved security, the Broker should restrict all un-
necessary communications and allow only connections with
authorized Gateways and the Network Server by implementing
Firewall rules at Broker level.
2) Network Server level: The Network Server plays an im-
portant role in the network, being responsible for network con-
trol and MAC commands, main actions being to manage end-
node sessions, schedule acknowledgements, manage receiving
windows of end-nodes, eliminate duplicate packets and adapt
data rates. The Network Server is a sensible component in
the LoRaWAN network, hence, it should implement rigorous
security controls.
The Network Server interacts with multiple entities such as
the Broker, Application Server and the database (see Fig. 2).
The Network Server together with these entities are part of a
PKI infrastructure model. Each connection with these entities
Fig. 2. Proposed LoRaWAN secure network architecture.
is made over TLS, using certificates generated by the CA. This
approach provides encryption and message authentication.
The Network Server uses the network keys (NwkSKey) to
sign and verify messages sent between end-nodes and the
server in order to prevent data processing of altered messages.
The key management mechanism should be carefully imple-
mented because the Network Server represents a single point
of failure in the LoRaWAN network.
The keys should be stored in a secure way and accessible
only by the Network Server. The keys should not be read or
altered by unauthorized parties.
For improved security, the Network Server should imple-
ment Firewall rules that restrict all unnecessary communica-
tions and allow only connections with the Broker, Application
Server and the database.
3) Application Server level: The Application Server is also
a sensible component and plays a main role for generating
and storing the keys used for authentication and message
encryption. Also, the Application Server stores and exposes
data received from the end-nodes. It is therefore required to
have rigorous security controls implemented at each level in
order to protect these data.
The Application Server interacts with two entities: the
Network Server and the database used to store sensitive data
about the end-nodes. Each connection with these entities is
made over TLS, using certificates generated by the CA part
of the PKI infrastructure.
The Application Server is responsible for management of
all keys in the network, generating and storing the keys
used by the end-nodes in the activation process and message
encryption. It is the most important component in the network.
In a worst-case scenario in which the Application Server is
compromised, an attacker would be able to access all end-
nodes keys, all messages, all payloads and all information from
the network.
The keys must therefore be stored in a secure way and
accessible only by the Application Server for encryption/de-
cryption purposes, the only exception being the network keys
(NwkSKey), which have to be transmitted to the Network
Server. As already indicated in section 3, these keys are used
by the Network Server for network message control.
The Application Server exposes an Application Program-
ming Interface (API), which is used for application manage-
ment, end-node management and to expose end-node data.
This interface is an important element of the network because
it gives access to sensitive data outside of the controlled
network area for other applications built based on these data.
Usually, the API exposes data through a web server. There-
fore, the web server must implement a secure connection by
using Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), based
on a TLS certificate signed by a global Certificate Authority
(e.g. Comodo or Let’s Encrypt).
The payloads received from end-nodes must be validated
and sanitized by the Application Server before making any
operations. The Application Server must implement functions
that check if the payload meets a set of criteria (e.g. testing for
the length, format, range, and allowable characters), accepting
only expected payload format. These techniques are used to
provide in-depth defence at application level.
Additionally, to improve security, the Application Server
should implement Firewall rules that allow connections with
the Network Server and its database, allow connections that
come from the API and restrict all other unnecessary connec-
tions.
4) Access management: Access management is an impor-
tant aspect in a secure infrastructure being responsible to
granting access and privileges to authorized users. Each entity,
part of the proposed infrastructure, should allow a Secure Shell
(SSH) connection, which is necessary for system updating and
maintenance processes. The access should be made only from
the internal network for authorized persons based on user and
IP whitelisting.
C. Availability
Availability is one of the most important security aspects
that should be taken into consideration in every network
implementation.
Availability is known as maintaining a correct functioning of
the system and providing adequate communication bandwidth
to keep data and resources available for authorized use. To
enable availability, the following mechanisms were proposed
and practically implemented.
1) Load balancing: Load balancing is a mechanism that
distributes the network traffic to multiple services. Load bal-
ancers increase the capacity of a system to support concurrent
connections. Implementing load balancing in a system is a
solution to enhance system strength when facing attacks such
as Denial of Service (DoS).
In the proposed secure architecture, load balancing should
be implemented on each entity of the infrastructure, including
the Virtual Private Network, the Broker, the Network Server,
the Application Server, and the Application Programming
Interface (API). By implementing load balancing for each
entity, the system keeps data transmission continuity between
components even if a service or more services are facing
functional failures.
2) Database clustering: Database clustering is a solution
used to increase database availability. A database cluster
consists of a set of connected databases that provide database
mirroring/replication and fail-over strategies.
In the proposed LoRaWAN network architecture, at least
two databases are present, that is, a database connected to
the Network Server which keeps the end-node sessions, and
a database connected to the Application Server which keeps
the data provided by the end-nodes and all encryption keys
used to communicate with end-nodes. It is mandatory to use
database clustering and to develop fail-over strategies for each
database used in the network in order to provide continuity and
availability of data transmission.
3) Data Backup: To support availability, a data backup
solution is mandatory to be implemented in the network. Data
backups are used in the process of restoring the network state
in case of disaster or if hacking activities render the network
unreachable.
In the proposed architecture, data backups are required for
the databases used by the Network Server and Application
Server. These databases handle all information about network
state, end-node sessions and encryption keys. Frequently pre-
serving data backups allows for network state restoration and
data recovery in case of severe network failures.
Data backups are also required for the Unified logging
system (see Fig. 2), which is a system that preserves each
entity’s logs from the network.
From a security perspective, the data backups should be
preserved in a secure environment, outside of the internal
network. In case of an event that renders the internal network
unreachable, the persons responsible for restoring the network
state should have access to data backups.
D. Monitoring and Intrusion detection system
In a secure architecture model, the presence of an intrusion
detection system (IDS) is required in order to monitor network
traffic for malicious activity or policy violations. Any detected
suspect activity or violation is reported to the network admin-
istrator or to persons responsible with security management.
In a LoRaWAN network, there are several sensible points
that require additional security controls such as an Intrusion
detection system. The most sensible points are the entry points
of the internal network; at these points, one has to implement
firewall rules to restrict connections other than the authorized
connections required by the application’s functionalities.
As mentioned, one sensible point of the network is the
connection of the Gateways with the internal network. In a
LoRaWAN network, the inbound and outbound traffic to and
from the Gateways can be predicted by calculating the traffic
generated by the end-nodes. Knowing the number of end-
nodes and their application configuration, the amount of regu-
lar inbound and outbound traffic can be coarsely approximated
with some safety margins. By establishing such a network
traffic baseline, a good practice is to implement an anomaly-
based intrusion detection technique which monitors the net-
work traffic and compares it against established baselines.
As baselines one identifies the bandwidth generally used
(with some margins), the employed protocols, generally con-
nected ports and devices; such a system generates alerts when
the detected traffic is significantly different than the recorded
baseline.
Another sensible point of the network is the API which
supports connections from outside to the internal network. Net-
work traffic control is provided by the implemented Firewall
rules. These rules allow traffic only on the port(s) onto which
the API exposes the application’s data. This connection should
be monitored by implementing a signature-based intrusion
detection technique which compares network packets against
a database of signatures or attributes from known malicious
threats. If malicious threats are detected, the system generates
alerts and notifies the network administrators. An anomaly-
based detection technique can also be used to complement the
traffic monitoring process.
The access from corporate to the internal network should
also be taken into consideration and should be permitted only
for authorized persons. This traffic should be monitored by
implementing security mechanisms that are able to detect
suspicious traffic activities and unauthorized access attempts
to the internal network’s entities.
V. TESTING & IMPLEMENTATION
A. Testing scenarios
During security assessment of the proposed LoRaWAN
network architecture, multiple testing scenarios were per-
formed. Table II presents testing results and recommendations
concluded from each scenario.
B. Implementation
For implementing and testing the proposed secure architec-
ture, we used a server with Intel Core i7 CPU 860 2.80GHz
quad core, 16GB of RAM, running the Proxmox VE operating
system, an open source solution for virtualization [6].
1) LoRaWAN sensor network: The testing environment
consists of a LoRaWAN application implemented using an
open-source solution for the back end server [7], the open-
source software provided by LoRa Alliance for implementing
the gateways [8], [9], and an open-source solution for im-
plementing the end-nodes [10], [11]. The employed hardware
components include: Rasbperry Pi 3 and IMST iC880A SPI
for the Gateways, and Raspberry Pi 3 and Semtech SX1276
for the end-nodes.
2) VPN: The software utilized for implementing the VPN
server is OpenVPN [12]. Each Gateway holds a digital cer-
tificate generated by the Certificate Authority and signed with
the server’s certificate.
The configuration file (/etc/openvpn/server.conf) includes:
• ”cipher AES-128-CBC” - to facilitate a good level of
encryption
• ”auth SHA256” - to select hash message authentication
code (HMAC)
• push ”route 10.10.10.0 255.255.255.0” - to facilitate the
access of Gateways into the internal network
A detailed tutorial to install and configure OpenVPN can
be found in [13].
3) IDS: The software utilized in the IDS implementation is
called Snort [14]. Snort is an open source intrusion detection
system used to perform real-time traffic analysis and packet
logging on IP networks.
In the proposed architecture, Snort is configured as a
network intrusion detection, monitoring network traffic and
analyzing it against different rules.
A first rule is implemented to alert any UDP traffic on a port
different than 1700 between any network, in our case only the
VPN network, and HOME NET:
alert udp any any -> \$HOME_NET !1700 (sid
:12345678; msg: "UDP traffic other than on
port 1700"; classtype: bad-unknown;)
HOME NET represents the internal network and its address is
set to 10.10.10.0/24. In a normal flow, the Gateways send data
to the internal network only on UDP port 1700. Any other
traffic should be alerted and reported as a sign of hacking
activity.
The second implemented rule has the main scope to alert
if the size of a packet sent on UDP port 1700 between VPN
and HOME NET is over 263 bytes:
alert udp any any -> \$HOME_NET 1700 (sid:
499124124; msg: "Large LoRa Packet"; dsize
: > 263; classtype: bad-unknown;)
The threshold is set to 263 bytes as this represents the
maximum size of a LoRaWAN packet. Any packet transmitted
by the Gateways with a size over 263 bytes can be interpreted
as a sign of hacking activity.
With the third rule, any attempt of TCP traffic that originates
from the VPN network and has the target the internal network
(HOME NET) is generating an alert and is reported as a
suspicious activity:
alert tcp any any -> \$HOME_NET any (sid
:124124215; msg: "TCP traffic over the
network"; classtype: bad-unknown;)
The rules implemented below generate alerts for any attempt
of SSH connection or any attempt of UDP traffic on port 1194
that target the host 10.8.0.1 (OpenVPN server). Any violation
of these rules is reported as suspicious activity:
alert tcp any any -> 10.8.0.1 22 (sid
:214143444; msg: "SSH attempt on OpenVPN
Server"; classtype: bad-unknown;)
alert udp any any -> 10.8.0.1 1194 (sid
:214143445; msg: "UDP traffic on port 1194
to OpenVPN Server"; classtype: bad-
unknown;)
4) Network traffic control: Each entity implements Iptables
rules which allow only network traffic necessary for a func-
tional LoRaWAN application and for system maintenance, any
other unnecessary connections being denied.
5) PKI: The proposed architecture implements a PKI
model using the open-source software solution provided by
Cloudflare [15]. Each entity of the architecture holds a certifi-
cate signed by the Certificate Authority (CA) and it uses it to
initiate secure communications with other entities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the security concerns of data protec-
tion and data privacy in applications based on LoRaWAN.
LoRaWAN’s transmission capabilities and security features
render it as one of the best technologies satisfying the fun-
damental requirements imposed by IoT applications.
LoRaWAN provides strong security features and protections
against different types of attacks such as end-node imperson-
ation, replay messages and prevents eavesdropping, tampering
or message forgery by implementing end-to-end message
encryption using AES128. However, these standard security
features are not sufficient for secure end-to-end LoRaWAN
sensor networks and applications. A LoRaWAN sensor net-
work is a complex system assembling multiple entities which
renders the process of securing it to be expensive both in terms
of cost and time.
The paper presents a set of best practices and considerations
that have to be followed in order to build an end-to-end
secure LoRaWAN sensor network. The paper also propose and
implements a secure LoRaWAN network architecture model
TABLE II
TESTING SCENARIOS, RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Entity Scenario Result Recommendation
End-node Sniffing LoRa Traffic LoRaWAN messages are encrypted and signed us-
ing AES128 keys during communication, offering
a strong protection against intercepting and reading
data in transit.
Keys should be stored in a secure place and
the access should be allowed only for authorized
entities.
End-node end-node impersonation LoRaWAN offers strong protection against imper-
sonation based on the sessions handled by the server.
Any impersonation attempt generates error messages
at Network Server level.
Implement a monitoring mechanism that alerts
suspicious activities of end-nodes based on wrong
messages received at Network Server level.
End-node Replay Messages Replay attacks can be achieved in ABP configu-
ration, only OTAA configuration offers protection
against such attacks.
Implement OTAA configuration for end-nodes.
Gateway Manipulate communica-
tion’s parameters
An exposed Gateway inevitably exposes communi-
cation. An attacker with direct access to the Gateway
is able to manipulate communication’s parameters
which can lead to a higher power consumption on
the end-nodes, which in turn determines battery




Gateway and internal net-
work
In such a scenario, an attacker is able to alter
the communication between the Gateway and the
internal network components, who believe they are
directly communicating with each other. The attacker
is able to intercept all messages or even inject new
ones.
The best option is to implement a VPN server
which provides encryption and authentication for
Gateways. Using a VPN connection, the internal
network’s resources can be accessed remotely
without exposing them to the public. Extra se-
curity controls such as Firewall rules and IDS
are necessary to enhance network security.
IDS Rules violation Performing multiple tests to violate the implemented
IDS rules to test the logging and alerting mechanism
A security and event-management software




Denial of Service: database
Out-of-Memory
The Network Server stores new sessions and keeps
the old sessions of each end-node. Generating a
large number of sessions till the database capacity
is completely filled yields a database out-of-memory
status.
Remove or replace any old end-node session
when a new session is generated. Also, each




to the Application Server
using the end-nodes
No vulnerabilities found, but may differ from one
implementation to another.
The payloads received from end-nodes must be
validated and sanitized by the Application Server,
which should accept only expected payload for-
mats before performing any subsequent opera-
tions.
that implements security controls to protect data transmitted
over the network and to provide an in-depth defence line for
the applications.
Additional challenges in this area include investigating
secure cross-network roaming solutions and efficient update
mechanisms of the firmware running on the sensors.
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